

Spring 2017
POL 35801
Formal Theory and Comparative Politics

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Thursday: 12-2:50 p.m.
Pick 324 A

Office hours: Thursday 3:30 - 5 p.m.

Course description

In this course we will discuss political science articles in Comparative Politics that employ formal modeling. The articles have been chosen in way that matches the interests of participants in the class, but they also constitute an excellent overview of the literature in Comparative Politics of recent years. Because of its topical breadth, this course may therefore be also taken as a field survey in comparative politics. There are two prerequisites: Game Theory I (offered in the Autumn) and Game Theory II (offered in the Winter). The prerequisites may be waived with the consent of the instructor.

Required and Recommended Material

The readings for this class are political science articles that have been uploaded to the chalk website. All students are expected to do the readings before the day they will be discussed. Please purchase Scott Gehlbach's *Domestic Models of Formal Politics* (Cambridge University Press) and Milan Svobik's *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (Cambridge University Press).

Presentations

Following April 20th, in the second part of each class, one of the students will be tasked with the challenge of presenting to their classmates the model they are working on. The presentation should take roughly 30 -45 minutes, although because of interruptions (as students struggle to grasp the model and ask presenters clarifying questions) the presentation may slightly go over the time allotted. To prepare the presentation, you should use Beamer. Keynote, Powerpoint or any software will not be easy to work with given the mathematical notation you are likely to use.

Final Paper

Throughout the quarter, you are encouraged to continue working on the project you that motivated your taking this class. My expectation is that you will develop a formal model that will be the “workhorse” of your revised paper and that it will respond to the comments received in class. You are encouraged to consult with me as you conduct those revisions during office hours. It is important that you realize that I expect you to improve on the model you presented in class. This final paper is due June 8th.

Prerequisites

The mathematical prerequisites for this course are rather steep. I expect you to be proficient in the material covered in Game Theory I and Game Theory II, at the level it is taught in the Political Science Department at the University of Chicago.

Problem Sets

Just as in the introductory game theory class, you may work on your problem sets in groups (of 2 or 3). You may submit just one version of the problem set per group, if you wish.

Grading

Grades will be assigned according to the following rubric:

- A 91-100%
- B 81-90%
- C 71-80% “+” and“-” grades will be given out by the instructor’s discretion.
- D 51-70%
- F < 50%

The requirement for this class will contribute to your final grade as follows:

Problem Sets	60%
Presentation	20%
Final Paper	20%

Problem Sets

There will be three problem sets (due **April 13, May 4, and May 25**). You will have 7 days to complete the exam.

Calendar

March 30: Introduction and Professor Nalepa’s presentation

April 6: Formal Modeling and Qualitative Case Studies Please note, the normal meeting time for this class is canceled due to the MPSA. Instead, please attend the Saturday 9:45 am Panel Formal Modeling and Qualitative Case Studies at the Palmer House Hilton in Downtown Chicago.

Readings:

Hein Goemans and William Spaniel: “Multi-Method Research: The Case for Formal Theory.” University of Rochester

Sections 1.2 and 1.3 from Patty, John and Maggie Penn “Social Choice and Legitimacy.” 2013. The University of Chicago Press.

Sections 1.3 and 1.4 from Sean Gailmard and John Patty “Learning while Governing”

Bates, Bob “From Case Studies to Social Science: A Strategy for Political Research

Nalepa, Monika. *Skeletons in the closet: Transitional justice in post-communist Europe.* Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Lorentzen, Peter, M Taylor Fravel and Jack Paine “Qualitative investigation of theoretical models: the value of process tracing” *Journal of Theoretical Politics*

Little, Andrew T., and Thomas B. Pepinsky. ”Simple and formal models in comparative politics.” *Chinese Political Science Review* 1.3 (2016): 425-447.

Ariel Rubinstein “Comments on Economic Models, Economics, and Economists: Remarks on Economics Rules by Dani Rodrik” *Journal of Economic Literature* 2017.

April 13: Jennifer Gandhi’s (guest) presentation

Readings:

Gandhi, J, John Ora-Reuter and “Expanding the Pie: Compensating Losers in Authoritarian Regimes”

Svolik, Milan Chapter 6 (“Why Authoritarian Parties?”) in “The Politics of Authoritarian Rule” 2012. Cambridge University Press.

April 20: Genevieve Bates Presentation

Chapter 3 FMDP

(for background on motivating case) Mueller, Susanne D. ”Kenya and the International Criminal Court (ICC): politics, the election and the law.” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8.1 (2014): 25-42.

Conrad, Courtenay R., and Emily Hencken Ritter. ”Treaties, tenure, and torture: The conflicting domestic effects of international law.” *The Journal of Politics* 75.2 (2013): 397-409.

April 27: Alexandra Chinchilla’s presentation Readings:

Chapter 3 FMDP

Fearon, James D. ”Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes.” *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 03 (1994): 577-592.

“Do audience costs exist?” a Symposium in Security Studies volume 21, issue 3

May 4: Ji Xue’s presentation

Readings:

Svolik, Milan Chapter 3 (“And then there was one!”) in “The Politics of Authoritarian Rule” 2012. Cambridge University Press.

Clark, WILLIAM ROBERTS, Matt Golder, and Sona Golder. “An Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Model of Politics.” *British Journal of Political Science* (2017)

May 11: Eddie Yang’s presentation

Readings:

Lorentzen, Peter L. ”Regularizing rioting: Permitting public protest in an authoritarian regime.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8.2 (2013): 127-158.

Tyson, Scott “The Agency Problem Underlying the Use of Repression”

May 18: Cathryn Grothe’s presentation

Readings:

Chapter 3 (“The Use of Institutions to Coopt”) from Gandhi, Jennifer “Political Institutions under Dictatorship.” 2008. Cambridge University Press.

Svolik, Milan Chapter 4 (“When and why institutions contribute to Authoritarian Powersharing?”) in “The Politics of Authoritarian Rule” 2012. Cambridge University Press.

May 19: Milan Svolik presents in TAM @3pm

May 25: Jing Zhang’s presentation

Readings:

Chapter 2 FMDP

Albertus, Michael “A Theory of Land Reform” (Chapter 3 in “Autocracy and Redistribution” Cambridge University Press 2015).

June 1: Ipek Cinar’s and Zhenya Olimpieva’s presentation

Readings:

Lohmann, Susanne. ”The dynamics of informational cascades: The Monday demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989/91.” *World politics* 47.01 (1994): 42-101.

Anne Meng “When Do Autocrats Share Power? A Theory of Party Institutionalization and Leader’

Chapter 8 from FMDP

Other recommended readings

Bureaucracy, delegation, expertise, oversight

1. Huber, John and Nolan McCarthy 2004. "Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation and Political Reform," *APSR* 98(3), 481-494
2. Gailmard, Sean and John W. Patty. 2007. "Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion and Bureaucratic expertise", *AJPS* 51(4) 873-889
3. Bednar, Jenna and Scott E. Page. 2007. "Can Game Theory Explain Culture? The Emergence of Cultural Behavior within Multiple Games" *Rationality and Society* 19(1):65-97.
4. Ting, M. M. (2003). "A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2): 274-292.
5. Bawn, K. (1997). "Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System." *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 13(1): 101-126.
6. Gailmard, Sean. 2009. "Multiple Principals and Oversight of Bureaucratic Policy-making." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 21(2): 161-186
7. Gailmard, Sean. 2009. "Discretion Rather than Rules: Choice of Instruments to Control Bureaucratic Policy Making." *Political Analysis* 17(1): 25-44
8. Gailmard, S. (2002). "Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discretion." *J Law Econ Organ* 18(2): 536-555.
9. McCarty, N. (2004). "The Appointments Dilemma." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 413-428.
10. Figueiredo, R. J. P. d., Jr. (2002). "Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation." *The American Political Science Review* 96(2): 321-333.
11. Huber, John D. and Nolan McCarty. 2006. "Bureaucratic Capacity and Legislative Performance" in *Macropolitics of Congress*, E. Scott Adler and John Lapinski, eds. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
12. Ferejohn, J. and C. Shipan (1990). "Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy." *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 6: 1-20.
13. Hopenhayn, H. and S. Lohmann (1996). "Fire-Alarm Signals and the Political Oversight of Regulatory Agencies." *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 12(1): 196-213.

Principal-agent models

1. Sappington, D. E. M. (1991). "Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5(2): 45-66.

2. Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (1992). "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values." *Econometrica* 60(1): 1-42.

Fair Division

1. Brams, S. J. and D. M. Kilgour (2001). "Competitive Fair Division." *The Journal of Political Economy* 109(2): 418-443.
2. Aumann, R. and M. Maschler (1985). "Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud." *Journal of Economic Theory* 36: 195-213.
3. Elster, J. (1992). *Local Justice. How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens.* New York, Russel Sage Foundation.
4. Kaminski, M., M. (2000). "Hydraulic Rationing." *Mathematical Social Sciences*.
5. O'Neil, B. (1982). "A Problem of Rights Arbitration from the Talmud." *Mathematical Social Sciences* 2: 345-371.
6. Young, P. (1987). "On Dividing an Amount according to Individual claims and Liabilities." *Mathematics of Operations Research* 12(No. 3 August 1987): 398 -414.
7. Young, P. (1994). "Equity in Theory and Practice." Princeton, Princeton University Press: 190 - 199 (Claims and Liabilities).
8. Young, P. (1994). "Equity in Theory and Practice." Princeton, Princeton University Press: 65-80 (Equity, Equality and Proportionality).

Legislative-Executive relations

1. Epstein, D. and S. O'Halloran (1996). "Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test." *The Journal of Politics* 58(2): 373-397.
2. Huber, J. D. (1996). "The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies." *The American Political Science Review* 90(2): 269-282.
3. Bernhardt, Dan, John Duggan and Francesco Squintani (2009). *American Political Science Review* 103 (4): 570-587
4. Ting, Michael M., (2009) "Legislatures, Bureaucracies and Distributive Spending" . APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1449846>

Signalling games

1. Farrell, J. and R. Gibbons (1989). "Cheap Talk can Matter in Bargaining." *Journal of Economic Theory* 48: 221-237.
2. Farrell, J. and R. Gibbons (1989). "Cheap Talk with Two Audiences." *The American Economic Review* 79(5): 1214-1223.